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Resumo
Normalmente, testar um sistema interativo envolve testar manualmente as pos-
síveis interações com ele. Uma vez que esta é uma abordagem manual, torna-se
muito caro verificar todas as interacções possíveis. Em sistemas interactivos de
segurança crítica esta tarefa é essencial. Uma forma de ultrapassar este prob-
lema é a utilização de ferramentas de análise sistemática. IVY Workbench é uma
dessas ferramentas. Pretendemos aplicá-la para realizar a verificação de um Sis-
tema Interactivo de Segurança Crítica. Os objetivos para esta dissertação são: de-
senvolver um conjunto de modelos de sistemas interactivos de segurança crítica,
verificar propriedades relevantes dos modelos, fazer uma avaliação crítica do pro-
cesso de modelação e sugerir melhorias para a ferramenta e linguagem.
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Abstract
Typically, testing an interactive system involves manually testing their possible
interactions. Since this is a manual process, it becomes very costly to check all
possible interactions. In safety critical interactive systems this task is essential.
One way to overcome this problem is to use tools for systematic analysis. IVY
Workbench is one of  these tools. We plan to apply it to perform verification of
Safety Critical Interactive Systems. The objectives for this dissertation are: de-
velopment of  a set of  models of  safety critical interactive systems; verification of
relevant properties of  the models; critical assessment of  the modelling process
and suggestion of  improvements to the tool and language.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays interactive systems are everywhere, so problems that resulted from
interactions with these systems appear more frequently. As systems becomes
more complex, and with more features, interaction with them becomes more com-
plex too. Like any other piece of  software, interactive systems need to be analysed
to guarantee their quality. In this kind of  systems, evaluation can be performed,
for example, with respect to how easy the system is to learn, how perceivable the
presented information is, or how predictable the system is. However, it must also
be considered whether the system prevents errors, and always behaves correctly.
We are interested in techniques that systematically verify Interactive Systems
with respect to safety. By safety we mean that the system is free from errors
and we want to establish that all possible interactions do not trigger any error or
erroneous behaviour. To achieve that, we focused in the exhaustive analysis of  all
possible system behaviour.
Several techniques are available to perform evaluation of  interactive systems
ranging from empirical studies with users to inspections performed by usability
experts (see [11] for a good coverage of  this topic). Typically the techniques are not
systematic and they consume too many resources (usually time and financial cost)
to achieve quality results. Besides, the studies results cannot guarantee safety,
since the techniques are not exhaustive in their analysis. To achieve exhaustive
verification of  Interactive Systems, we will analyse formal methods that allow it
applicability, for systematic verification. This will guarantee that if  a system’s
property is proven/demonstrated, then we can be sure that it always holds for
that system. Such warranty is required since, we will apply this kind of  analysis
1
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to Safety Critical Interactive Systems.
1.1 Motivation
Evaluation of  interactive systems should be done during the development cycle,
and not at its end. In chapter 9 of  their book on Human Computer Interaction,
Dix et al. [11] discuss several approaches to the evaluation of  Interactive Sys-
tems. They distinguish evaluation techniques according to who is involved: the
designer/usability expert or the user. Some techniques are carried out only by
designers/usability experts, others need common users to be performed.
Evaluation of  an Interactive System may have several objectives, which can be
evaluate the reachability of  system functionalities, evaluate the users’ interaction
experience, or identify any specific problem with the system. The book describes
several techniques like cognitive walkthrough, which main goal is to establish how
easy a system is to learn, heuristic evaluation, experimental evaluation, observa-
tion, queries and evaluation through monitoring physiological responses. Some
of  them are performed by experts. Others, analysis of  data obtained through user
experiences with the system. In an experimental evaluation, an evaluator chooses
one or more hypothesis to be tested, and experiments are performed with a sig-
nificant number of  potential target users and the data from the experiments is
collected for later analysis. This technique can be seen as bug finding, in the
sense that, errors are “caught” in the collected data of  the experiences. However,
bug finding is just not enough to perform verification in Safety Critical Interactive
Systems, as the user could miss some critical interaction with the System.
An Interactive System is safety critical when its failures can lead to loss of
human lives, or loss of  a large amount of  money, or even both. Examples of  such
systems can be found in aeronautics and space, aviation, banking, health or even
sports. Sport might not be an obvious area, but safety-critical interactions exists
mostly in motorsport systems. For example, a steering wheel of  a Formula 1 (F1)
car, or a telemetric monitoring system, are Interactive Systems whose failure could
cause loss of  lives (pilot or even audience) and loss of  quite large amount of  money
(a top team F1 car may cost 2-3 million euros).
Another problem with “traditional” techniques is that they require a consider-
able amount of  usability expertise (knowledge of  the principles and guidelines),
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time (to observe user interactions) and resources (users to perform experiences),
to get accurate results, and that they cannot be performed automatically. All the
techniques presented above cannot verify Interactive System, they just give indi-
cations at the level of  usability and proper operation of  what was tested, but not in
an exhaustive manner, which is not enough for Safety Critical Interactive Systems.
One way to achieve systematic analysis is by using formal i.e., mathematically
rigorous, methods. Formal analysis of  Safety Critical Interactive Systems has been
applied to a number of  interactive systems in aviation and health. These analysis
were able to find problems with either security [2, 16] or disrespect for good prac-
tice in interface design [18]. Some concepts like graph theory were also applied
[19]. The IVY Workbench has been applied to some realistic case studies [6, 7, 8],
and there is interest in exploring its applicability to Safety Critical Interactive Com-
puting Systems in the space domain.
The system under consideration is Brazilian Aeronautics and Space Institute’s
(IAE) current satellite launcher Testing and Preparation Ground System (TPGS).
TPGS includes several operators’ interactions that enable control over the teleme-
try and other aspects of  the preparation and launching of  the rocket. Each inter-
face screen enables interaction between the operator and the system via a graph-
ical user interface.
1.2 Research Methodology and Goals
The main objective of  this research is to apply IVY Workbench to the IAE’s TPGS,
which is a critical system supporting space mission preparation. The adopted
research methodology follows the activities below:
• review the recent and state-of-the-art publications;
• study the system to model based on the user manuals and remote interaction
with the IAE’ researchers;
• develop a set of  models of  the IAE’ TPGS;
• test critical properties over the developed models.
Although the IVY Workbench had been chosen from the outset as the tool to model
TPGS, the analysis of  similar tools was required in order to understand how better
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and appropriate the IVY Workbench is when compared to them. Another particu-
larity is that the system was modelled based on the user manual and not on the
actual system.
The objectives of  the research then are:
• to develop a set of  models of  the system addressing different modelling ap-
proaches;
• perform properties verification over the models;
• propose improvements and new features in both the language and the tool
based on the modelling process results.
1.3 Structure of the Document
This document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains an analysis of  some
tools used to model and verify Interactive Systems. The main characteristics of
the tools are described, and a comparison between them is made.
In Chapter 3, the language used to model the system under study, the MAL
Interactors language, is described. The structure of  an Interactor is introduced,
alongside with what can be expressed with the language.
Chapter 4 introduces the system to be modelled. What it is used for, its archi-
tecture and all its subsystems. Moreover, issues to be addressed in the modelling
process are described.
In Chapters 5 and 6 the modelling of  two TPGS’s subsystems, Flight Events Se-
quence Network (EV) and Electric Control Network (CR) respectively, is described.
The obtained models are described step by step and analysed.
In Chapter 7 an analysis of  both the models and the tool is made. Concerning
the analysis of  the models, some verified properties are shown. Data on the veri-
fication times obtained in the two machines that performed the tests is analysed.
The tool analysis is related to the language improvements and tool changes that
can be made in order to reduce the modelling and verification times, and to make
the tool more versatile.
The document ends in Chapter 8 with a synthesis of  the work done, the con-
clusions obtained, and the future work to be carried out.
Chapter 2
State-of-the-art
In the previous chapter we have mentioned that typical user interface evalua-
tion techniques are usually not automated and can take a considerable amount of
time and resources to apply. Now, we will consider some techniques/formalisms
that use model checking to perform automated and exhaustive verification of  In-
teractive Systems.
Model checking is a technique for formally verifying systems specified as finite-
state machines [9]. Desirable properties of  the behaviour of  the system are ex-
pressed as temporal logic formulas [10] (e.g. LTL, CTL), and a traversal of  the
finite-state machine is performed in order to check if  certain defined property
holds or not.
Four tools will be considered: PetShop, which uses Petri nets; the VEG toolkit,
which uses grammars; SAL (Symbolic Analysis laboratory), a framework that com-
bines different verification tools; and the IVY workbench, which uses Modal Action
Logic to specify the models.
2.1 PetShop
PetShop1 is an environment to edit, verify, and execute Interactive Cooperative
Objects (ICO) models. Palanque proposed the ICO [15] formalism, which is in-
tended to specify interactive systems. ICO is an object-oriented formalism, that
can be seen as a class, divided in four different parts:
1http://www.irit.fr/recherches/ICS/softwares/petshop/
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 a Data structure which is a set of  typed attributes;
 a set of  Operations that are called services (part of  that set of  operations
are also the internal operations that can only be invoked by the object that
defines them);
 an object Object Control Structure (ObCS) that defines the behaviour of  the
ICO;
 and a Presentation specified by a set of widgets, that connect the user inter-
action with the object’s user services.
The ObCS, besides defining the behaviour of  the ICO, defines all behaviour re-
garding to the services, such as service availability, service requests processing,
services required as a client, and own operations. To represent all these features
a high-level Petri Net is used. The Places of  the Petri Net, are seen as the states of
the system, and the Transitions as the services of  the ICO. User interactions, called
user services, are represented as ellipses, linked to the corresponding Transition.
Presentation as mentioned above is a set of widgets, and is the only place
where the interaction between user and system is performed, so each widget could
activate an user service. Each window of  an interactive system, is modelled by one
ICO and so, the synchronization between ICO’s services are defined in the ObCS.
From this specification it is possible to automatically verify the model. Several
tools are available to verify CTL/LTL formulas in Petri Nets, and some interesting
properties can be proved (for example, the absence of  deadlock). However, be-
cause the system is represented in more then one ICO, we need to verify more
then one ICO at the same time. This formalism has been applied to various kinds
of  systems including a plane cockpit display system, an example of  a Safety Crit-
ical System [1].
One problem in this tool/formalism, and generally in model checking, is the
state space explosion problem. The number of  states needed to represent a System
can become massive, making it non viable to analyse all the states either due to
processing time/power demands, or due to memory demands. For small systems
this problem does not exist, but a real system may have a very large number of
states, or even an infinite number. PetShop uses a model checker that represents
the states explicitly, so the verification of  properties can become too costly, or
simply not viable.
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2.2 VEG toolkit
To resolve the problem of  state explosion, Berstel et al.[3] proposed VEG toolkit,
which, instead of  using Petri Nets, use an extension of BNF grammars to specify
GUIs. The idea is to decompose the specification of  a large GUI interface into
a communicating automata, which reduces the state space [3]. A VEG object
represents an automaton and is specified by a grammar representing a small part
of  the GUI. The specifications are independent of  the layout of  the GUI, so there
is a separation between presentation and behaviour, which makes the reuse of
the same behaviour in different presentations possible. The grammar of  a VEG
object specifies the behaviour, and communication between components by a set
of  rules, typically with the following format:
<current state> ::= <guard> <communication> <visual action>
<goto next state>
Each rule specifies the behaviour of  a component in a state. The <current state>
is the state we are specifying, the <guard> is the event or set of  events that
”trigger” the rule, <communication> is where we send events to other components,
and <visual action> is where we specify the visual changes. These changes are
programmed independently from the grammar rules, based on the particular
presentation toolkit.
Besides the separation of  presentation from behaviour, VEG has separation of
data and control. As defined above, a specification in VEG is composed by a part
that describes the event-driven behaviour of  the GUI, and other part describing the
manipulation of  data. Sometimes these separations need to be bridged. Consider,
a simple GUI that reads a number, and shows a mark which turns green or red
depending on whether the number is even or odd, respectively. The routine for
checking the number is independent from the GUI design, but the result influences
the behaviour of  the GUI. To model this kind of  routines VEG uses Semantic Func-
tions which are collected in the Semantic Library and are written in a programming
language. The result of  these functions can be passed to visible actions.
As with the ICO formalism, the verification of VEG specifications is done using
model checking. Because a specification in VEG is not an automaton per si, or
some structure to which model checking can be directly applied, a translation of
the specification to a model that can be verified by a model checker is needed.
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Besides that, VEG was designed in a way that makes it easy to translate the
specification into an abstraction in order to reduce the state space. VEG toolkit2,
the tool used for specification, verification, design and implementation of  graphical
user interfaces in VEG, translates VEG specifications to Promela, the language of
the SPIN model checker. With SPIN we can test consistency and correctness,
detect deadlocks and unreachable states, and generate test cases for validation
which is a new feature that we do not have in ICO. The properties to check can
only be specified using LTL.
Because the Promela specification is an abstraction of  the original VEG specifi-
cation, we face new problems: Soundness and Completeness.
For a program P , an error location ", and an algorithm A that performs abstraction
of  a system/program:
 A is sound iff A(P; ") = ”safe” then P is safe w.r.t. ".
 A is complete iff P is safe w.r.t. " then A(P; ") = ”safe”.
For this particular case we say that, the algorithm that abstracts the VEG
specification to a Promela specification is sound if  and only if  when some property
is true (or false) in the Promela specification then the same property is true (or
false) in the VEG specification. The algorithm is complete if  and only if  when some
property is true (or false) in the VEG specification then that property is true (or
false) in the Promela specification.
From the undecidability of  the halting problem [4], we know that there is no
sound and complete A. So there are two approaches: falsification and verification.
Falsification is the exploration of  a subset of  states of  the original specification,
so this approach is like a bug finder in the sense that, if  we find an error it exists
in the original specification. On the other hand, if  it is not possible to find the
error in the abstraction, we can say nothing about the absence of  that error, in
the original specification. Verification consists on the exploration of  a superset of
states of  the original problem. In this case if  we do not find an error it actually do
not exists in the original. On the other hand, if  we find an error, that error could
be actually a genuine error, that can be reproduced in the original specification,
or could be spurious, i.e., the error is not feasible in the original specification.
2http://home.dei.polimi.it/campi/veg/
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Apart from these problems model checking can be applied for verification, and
VEG formalism was applied to several systems, like an editor similar to Notepad,
a graph construction library and a large real medical software application. More
than verifying properties, the VEG toolkit can generate Java code of  the specified
GUI. This is a major difference between the previous formalism, and makes the
modelling useful to implement the GUI, which is a good way to attract the industry
to use the tool.
2.3 Symbolic Analysis Laboratory
In many examples we might need to represent many numerical variables, and in
some cases we might need to represent real numbers with no approximation. SAL
is a formalism/tool developed at SRI International3 that has a unique “infinite”
bounded model checker, capable of  performing verification in such systems. SAL-
env is a framework for combining different tools for abstraction, analysis, theorem
proving and model checking of  transition system. SALenv has an intermediate
language called SAL to specify transition systems, which is similar to input lan-
guages used in other verification tools like SMV4, or Mur5. The abstract syntax
tree of SAL is specified in XML, which makes this language easy to translate to
other modelling and programming languages.
A SAL model is a context, and a context is a container of  types, constants, and
modules (which represents a transition system). A type can be an enumeration
or an infinite set like fx : REAL j x > 0 AND x < 10g. Constants can be seen
as global variables of  that context, that cannot be changed. A module is where
the specification of  the transition system is in. Inside a module we have one or
more input, output, local, or global variables, an initialization “zone” where we
can define initial values for the variables and a definition area where we can define
invariants. Still inside a module, we have a transition “zone” where we define
the transitions (“steps”) of  the system. In Fig. 2.1 we can see an example of  a
SAL context, that nondeterministically switches its state from ready to busy and
vice-versa. Being this language intended to be platform independent, due to its
3http://sal.csl.sri.com/
4http://www.cs.cmu.edu/ modelcheck/smv.html
5http://www.cs.utah.edu/formal_verification/Murphi/
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Figure 2.1: SAL context example.
abstract syntax being specified in XML, it is easy to apply several model checkers
to a SAL model. In fact, SALenv has several model checkers with many approaches
with respect to how the model is abstracted and represented (i.e., BDD-based
model checker, SAT Solving, SMT Solving, etc). While there is the possibility to
check properties with LTL and CTL, the current version of SAL framework does
not print counterexamples for CTL properties, and can only verify CTL properties
that can be translated to LTL. In fact, the verification of CTL properties is still
experimental.
Another feature present in this framework is the Path Finder, which is a random
trace generator. Giving a context and a module of  a SAL specification, the Path
Finder randomly generates a trace, where the number of  transitions of  the generated
trace can also be specified. Like the VEG formalism, SALenv has a automated test
generator that generates test cases.
One good feature, that PetShop also has, is the possibility of  performing simula-
tion over the models. This is a good feature to test specific sequence of  actions
in order to perform a first validation of  the model. Something that in traditional
temporal logics, like LTL or CTL, is hard to achieve. The simulator available in SAL
framework is a command line-like interface.
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2.4 IVY Workbench
Campos et al. have proposed the IVY Workbench, a similar tool to the previous
one, which supports a modelling, verification and analysis cycle of  interactive
systems. In this tool the Interactor is the main concept used to structure the
models. The Interactor concept (Faconti and Paternò, 1990; Duke and Harrison,
1993) was proposed to help designers focus on key issues in interactive systems.
An Interactor is a kind of  an object capable of  representing its state in any rendering
environment. Several formal specification languages have been used to specify In-
teractors, like Z and VDM. As SAL, IVY Workbench has an intermediate language
to specify a model, which is an adapted version of  Modal Action Logic (MAL) [17].
The definition of  an Interactor has three main components:
 State;
 Behaviour;
 Render.
The State is represented by a set of  typed attributes. Actions are used to manipulate
the State of  the Interactor. The Behaviour is described using an extended version
of  Structured MAL. In addition to the usual propositional operators and actions
the logic provides a modal operator, two deontic operators, and a special reference
event to specify the initialization of  the state variables. The modal operator defines
a relation on the current and next values of  attributes, given a particular action.
The rendering relation of  the Interactor is defined by using the annotation [vis]
before an action or an attribute. The annotation before an attribute shows that the
attribute is visibly perceivable, when attached to an action, that it can be invoked
by the user. The composition of Interactors is done using aggregation. The actions
and attributes of  an aggregated Interactor are always accessible to the Interactor
that aggregates it.
A compiler, i2smv, translates the MAL Interactors model to a Symbolic Model
VerifierSMV specification, in order to perform model checking. IVY Workbench has
some features to perform the verification and analysis. The tool can be divided in
three main components (features):
 ModelEditor;
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 PropertiesEditor;
 TraceAnalyzer;
 WildAniMAL.
The ModelEditor is the component where we write our models using MAL Inter-
actors. Model editting can be done in plain text or using a GUI interface. The
PropertiesEditor, as its name suggests, is the section where we can define the
formulas. Formulas can be written in text, as in the ModelEditor, or they can
be constructed, using a GUI Wizard, from a set of  patterns available in the tool.
For the formulas that have been checked false, the model checker generates a
trace of  a counterexample. The TraceAnalyzer is the component that helps the
designer understand why the formulas are checked false. From a formula checked
as false, the TraceAnalyzer gets the trace of  the counterexample, and then shows
it using a number of  different representations. The WildAniMAL is the component
where the model can be simulated. It helps to test the behaviour of  the model by
experimentation, which is useful to test simple interactions.
2.5 Conclusion
From the analysis above we have seen that all the tools can verify LTL formulas,
and only PetShop and IVY can verify CTL formulas. SAL can verify CTL formulas
too, but with a particularity, only CTL formulas that can be translated to LTL.
Another difference between the tools relates to the verification techniques that
they provide. All the tools verify properties using the model checking technique.
The PetShop performs model checking over Petri Nets, the VEG toolkit over a
Promela specification and IVY over a SMV specification. The SAL env performs
model checking through SAT and BDD-based model checkers. In SAL env is also
possible to verify properties through theorem proving with SMT solvers. That
makes the SAL env more versatile, specially to verify bigger systems, because
theorem provers are faster than model checkers [14] (although it must be noted
that this is done at the expense of  the fully automated nature of  model checking,
in particular in the case of  liveness). Table 2.1 summarizes the above discussion.
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Formalism/Tool Specification Abstract Representation Verification
PetShop Petri Net Petri Net LTL, CTL
VEG toolkit Grammar Promela Specification LTL
SAL env SAL Language SMT, SAT, BDD LTL
IVY Workbench MAL Interactors SMV Specification LTL, CTL
Table 2.1: Summary of  the analysis.
We have seen a number of  approaches but the same methodology for verifying
an interacting system: design a model of  the system and perform verification,
either by checking properties (LTL, CTL, etc) or by simulation. One problem
with checking properties is that they can be hard to specify. The problem with
simulation is that it can take a long time, and we can not be assured that we have
gone through all the states. What if  we could check a property and simulate at
the same time? For example, follow a path of  execution, and verify the validity
of  a certain property. Or check the validity of  a certain property, where the user
can only use some predefined actions. That kind of  analysis and modelling is
a task analysis-related, and was used with several formalisms and tools, like
ICO, SAL and IVY Workbench. In this approach we restrict/guide the analysis
trough a predefined behaviour of  the user. This analysis is hard to be done just
using temporal logic, and in some cases is just impossible, due to the limited
expressiveness of  the logics. In ICO and IVY Workbench the “starting point” is
the model of  the system. Now we need to create a user task model and then
perform the typical analysis with the temporal logic. Good examples of  this kind
of  modelling and analysis in ICO and IVY Workbench can be found in [15, 5],
respectively. In ICO and IVY Workbench the separation between system model and
user model is clear. This enables us to make both analysis without overcomplicating
the system model. In IVY we have both models as different Interactors, and only
need to create an interactor that will aggregate them and perform the orchestration
between them. In ICO the user model only needs to link the user action to the
actions in the system.
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Chapter 3
Modelling in the IVY wokbench
Section 2.4 provided a brief  introduction to the IVY workbench. This is the
tool that will be used in the remaining of  this dissertation. As such, this chapter
provides more details regarding the modelling languages supported by the tool.
Two languages are considered: on one side, MAL interactors, the language used to
describe the interactive systems; on the other, CTL, the language used to express
properties for verification.
3.1 The MAL Interactors language
As described in section 2.4 the main concept used to structure MAL Interactor
models is the Interactor, which has three main components: state, behaviour and
rendering. Figure 3.1 shows two of  these components (state and behaviour) in the
SIN Interactor.
The state is represented by typed attributes, as in the example. MAL Interactors
have two base types only, the boolean and enumeration types. In figure 3.1 Colour,
Characteristic, Id and Int are enumerated types. Enumerations, as is to be expected,
are defined by explicitly listing all the possible values of  the type. When the values
are sequential (integer) numbers, the definitions can be simplified by using ranges
that indicate the first and last number in the sequence only. Hence, type Int
was defined as 0..5, which is is equivalent to explicitly defining the enumeration
{0,1,2,3,4,5}. Besides declaring its own attributes, an interactor can aggregate
other interactors, thus allowing structuring the model (see the aggregates clause
in the figure).
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Figure 3.1: Interactor example.
Behaviour is defined by a set of  actions, in the example they are declared
below the attributes. The behaviour of  the actions is defined using axioms in MAL
logic. These axioms define the semantic in terms of  their effect on the state of  the
Interactor. In addition to the usual propositional operators, the logic provides:
• a modal operator [_] _, which means that if  [ac] expr then expr is true in all
states reached by the action ac;
• a special reference event [], that means, if  [] expr then expr is true in the inicial
state(s);
• a deontic operator per, means that if per(ac) then action ac is permitted to
happen next;
• a deontic operator obl, means that if obl(ac) then action ac is obliged to
happen some time in the future;
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• operator effect, means that if effect(ac) then action ac happen at the exact
moment
The special reference event [] is used to define the initial values of  the attributes,
as we can see in line 59 of  figure 3.1. In this case, it is being stated that attribute
automatic has the value true in the initial state.
The modal operator is used to define the behaviour of  an action, i.e. the effect
that the action has on the attributes of  the Interactor(s). In the expr part of  the
modal operator, the next state of  an attribute is represented by a prime, as seen
in line 70 of  the figure 3.1.
Moreover when we want to express that certain attribute remains unchanged
the keep operation is used, as seen in line 68 of  the figure 3.1. In this case the
axiom states that when action recAlarAler happens with value BD1A as parameter,
the attribute automatic remains unchanged.
The expressions in lines 68 and 69 are particular cases of  the generic expression:
[Action] Consequence
This means that when the Action occurs the Consequence happens. From this
expression and making use of  an implication another generic expression can be
defined:
Condition –> [Action] Consequence
Similar to the previous but now the Consequence only happens, if  the Action occurs
and the Condition is true.
In some situations more than one action have the same consequence. To reduce
duplications in the model it is possible to use the following “syntactic sugar”:
[ac1|ac2|ac3] Consequence
[!(ac1|ac2|ac3)] Consequence
The first line means that when the actions ac1 or ac2 or ac3 occurs the Conse-
quence happens. The other line means that when any action in the Interactor with
the exception of ac1, ac2,ac3 occurs the Consequence happens.
An action can have parameters as is the case of  actions setValue2 and setAlar-
Aler in figure 3.1. Sometimes the definition of  an action depends on the values
that are received in the parameters.
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[ac(_v)] Condition_on_v –> Consequence
This previous expression means that when action ac occurs with values on the
parameters that obey Condition_on_v, then Consequence happens.
The deontic operators are used to express permissions.
per(Action) –> Condition
This previous expression means that the Action is only allowed to occur if  the Con-
dition holds. An example of  this kind of  expression is in line 63 of  figure 3.1. That
expression means that the action setValue2(BD1A,_v) (where _v is implicitly univer-
sally quantified) is only allowed, when the action BD1_A.setValue(_v) is happening.
The obl operator is used in similar expressions.
obl(Action) –> Condition
This means that if  the Condition is true, then the Action must happen in the future.
With all these expressions it is now possible to create an entire model.
3.2 CTL – Computational Tree Logic
The language to specify the properties for verification is CTL [10], a branching
time logic. The behaviour of  a system over time is seen as a tree-like structure
(figure 3.2) in which at each moment in time, represented as a node in the tree,
there are several possible futures (the branches sprouting from the node). Hence,
a concrete behaviour of  the system, i.e., a computation path will be a possibly
infinite path going down the tree from its root.
Besides the classical logic operators the CTL language has path quantifiers and
temporal operators. Temporal operators are:
• A p - meaning that p holds for all computation paths;
• E p - meaning that p holds for some computation paths.
These operators are used to describe the branching structure in the computation
tree. The temporal operators are:
• X p - meaning that p holds in the next state;
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Figure 3.2: Branching Time.
• F p - meaning that eventually (i.e., in the future) p holds;
• G p - meaning that p always holds;
• p U q - meaning that q eventually holds and until then p always holds;
These operators are used to describe properties of  a path through the tree.
With all these operators we can specify a wide range of  properties, including
liveness and safety properties. A liveness property asserts that something good
does happen eventually. A safety property asserts that something bad does not
happen.
In our study case, because most of  the properties are defined to check that
what was modelled complies with the manual, we will want to specify properties
that can give us counter examples to check if  the system is behaving as expected.
3.3 Conclusion
This section has introduced the languages used for modelling (MAL interactors)
and expressing properties for verification (CTL) in the IVY workbench, the tool
which will be used in the remainder of  this dissertation. More details about IVY
and its modelling language can be found in [6, 8]. For more details about CTL,
see, for example, the book by Clarke et al. on model checking [9].
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Chapter 4
TPGS – a Case Study
The Testing and Preparation Ground System (TPGS) is a space ground legacy
system that has been in use to support space mission preparation for more than 15
years in the Brazilian Space Launcher Program. TPGS’ software components are
often updated due to new missions requirements, different rocket configurations,
and new operating systems releases. The hardware is occasionally upgraded due
to the obsolescence of  the TPGS’ equipment.
As main contractors are in charge of  the upgrade activities, there is a need
to provide a set of  user interface requirements for correct mission-safety system
operation as the system evolves due to new updates. The goal then, is to study the
feasibility of  modelling and analysing the user interface of  the system with the IVY
tool. This will allow the requirements to be formally modelled and verified against
critical properties, and used as a requirement baseline (an oracle) for the TPGS
during the acceptance phase of  new versions of  the system.
4.1 Overall architecture of the System
TPGS is a safety-critical system, composed of  very specific and customized
hardware and software components, responsible for the ground control, testing
and preparation of  a satellite launch rocket before it is launched. TPGS includes six
different subsystems that provide specific functionality during the rocket’s testing
and preparation for launching:
PW subsystem: rocket’s power supply, charging and discharging of  the rocket’s
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Figure 4.1: The PTGS’s macro architecture.
batteries.
PR subsystem: rocket’s electro-pneumatic equipment pressurization, activation
of  the pyrotechnic valves and unplugging of  its umbilical cords.
CR subsystem: testing and preparation of  the rocket’s control sub-network, includ-
ing the initiation of  its Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) and its on-board
computer.
SC subsystem: security and safety testing of  the rocket’s equipment and the ac-
tivation of  its security valves during the automatic sequencing for launching.
EV subsystem: flight events sequence testing and the activation of  the rocket’s
security mechanical devices (SMD) during the automatic sequencing for launch-
ing.
MN subsystem: visualization of  the information collected during the rocket’s test-
ing, preparation and automatic sequencing for launching.
Figure 4.1 shows the macro architecture of TPGS, showing its main subsystems
and its external interfaces.
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4.2 User Interfaces
The functional requirements for the TPGS were established separately for each
subsystem in a 250-page document. The rocket’s preparation process for the flight
involves thoroughly checking specific parts of  rocket’s electrical network. The
operators of  each subsystem illustrated in Figure 4.1 must follow a comprehensive
preparation checklist that includes procedures and interactions with the rocket’s
hardware and software in real-time. The preparation and testing process is mainly
based on the user interfaces inputs and outputs. As each TPGS’s subsystem has
a specific set of  critical procedures to be accomplished, the user interfaces must
provide an acceptable level of  trustworthiness to deal with this situation.
Each user interface is composed of  a number of  panels. Some panels present
messages to the operator about the state of  the system/process, others allow him
to interfere in the system/process, for instance running tests. In some cases,
graphical representations (i.e. synoptics) are used, while in other case the panels
consist mostly of  buttons and textual fields. Due to confidentiality constraints,
we are not able to describe here the user interfaces in any detail. In any case,
it is relevant to note that each panel can contain several tens of  user interface
components, and that they are interconnected so that events in one panel will
affect others. This will become clearer in the description of  the models presented
in the following chapters.
4.3 Selecting components for analysis
Considering the TPGS’ user interfaces complexity, we decided to select two of
the subsystems to apply our approach, the EV subsystem and the CR subsystem.
By modeling them, we intended to address two issues:
• determine whether the expressiveness of  the language was enough to model
the type of  user interfaces used in the aerospace field (and study the best
approach to model them);
• determine the viability of  analysing systems as complex as these (and study
the level of  detail that could be achieved while maintaining the analysis feasi-
ble).
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The EV Subsystem is responsible for the testing and preparation of  one of  the
rocket’s electrical sub-networks, where the flight events and the rocket’s security
mechanical devices (SMD) are activated. During the rocket’s flight, this sub-net-
work is responsible for the sequential activation and control of  the pyrotechnic
systems in real-time according to a pre-programmed flight strategy.
The CR subsystem is responsible for testing, simulating, and analysing the
automatic launch sequence, and monitoring a number of  devices in the rocket
after the launch.
4.4 Modelling Strategies
Considering the size of  the subsystems being modelled, two main modelling
strategies were considered. The first makes use of  the Object-oriented features
of  the MAL Interactor language. Each model becomes a tree-like composition
of  Interactors (organised through aggregation relations), where each Interactor
represents an entity in the interface (e.g. a panel or a control representing the state
of  a variable in one of  the panels). The second strategy uses only one Interactor
and models all the interface in that single Interactor. Visually we can see this
strategy as a “flat” hierarchy.
It is envisaged that the first strategy will be better in terms of  the organisation,
maintainability and understandability of  the model. One potential problem with
this first approach relates to expressing communication between the different
Interactors. Communication is achieved by explicit synchronisation on actions
or variables’ values between Interactors. Because of  the tree-like compositional
nature of  the language, this can only be done top down in the composition tree. For
example, in Figure 4.2 Interactor main knows Interactors TMT and ALAR, but these
have no knowledge of  each other or of  Interactor main. Hence, communication
between any two Interactors must be expressed in the Interactor at the root of  the
subtree they belong to (in the example, main).
One advantage of  the first approach is the “reusing” of  code. As the modelled
system has several variables that record telemetry values, we can simply write a
Interactor that captures the behaviour of  a variable. Then in the screen that has
these variables, we can instantiate as many Interactors as we want to represent
the variables. The only code we need to add, besides the aggregation, is the
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Figure 4.2: An hierarchy of  interactors.
synchronization properties.
Besides the strategies to structure the model, strategies for specifying depen-
dencies between variables must also be considered. In many cases the value of  a
variable will depend on the values of  other variables in the model. One possibility
is to express these dependencies in the definition of  actions. Actions will affect
these dependent variables differently according to specific conditions expressed
as guards in the modal axioms. This will result in more complex modal axioms,
and the guards must be repeated for each axioms.
When a variable’s values depends exclusively on other variables (and not on
specific actions) an alternative is to use invariants. By their nature, invariants can
be useful for more than one action. They are a global property that we assure that
is always true.
In Chapter 7 we will further explore the invariants vs. guards approach to
expressing dependencies between variables, in particular with respect to verifica-
tion performance.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has briefly described the system under analysis, the selected
subsystems, and the modelling strategies that were considered for the analysis.
The next chapters will present the modelling of  the selected subsystems.
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Chapter 5
EV Subsystem
EV subsystem is the Flight Events Sequence Network. It is a subsystem of
TPGS, responsible to test and prepare one of  the rocket’s electrical sub-network.
In the next section the modelling strategy adopted is explained. In the following
sections the modelling of EV subsystem is presented.
5.1 Structure of the model
Figure 5.1 shows the architecture of  the model. A main Interactor coordinates
a number of  other Interactors, each corresponding to a different panel in the user
interface. In this case four panels are being considered: SIN, a Synoptic panel,
shows the EV’s electrical network; TMT, the telemetry panel, show information
obtained from the telemetry system; ALAR, the alarms panel, shows messages
regarding values that are in the alarm state; ALER, the alerts panel, show messages
regarding values that are in the alert state. Each of  these panels aggregates
variables representing the information they display.
It must be noted that panels Alarm and Alert are special cases. They display
the variables which are in an alarm or alert condition in the other panels. Hence,
the values of  their attributes must be coordinated with the attributes in the other
interactors.
27
28 CHAPTER 5. EV SUBSYSTEM
Figure 5.1: The models’s macro architecture.
5.2 Navigation between screens
First, we started by modelling the navigation between the screens (one for each
panel) of  the system. That behaviour was represented in the main Interactor with
the variable display with type Screens which is a set of  the possible screens.
types
Screens = {Principal, Sinotico, MonitTel, aler, alar, ...}
interactor main
attributes
[vis] display: Screens
actions
sin
tmt
alarmes
...
There is an initial panel for the operator to login to the system. Only after the
operator have successfully logged in the main panel appears. To change between
screens the user interface provides a set of  buttons. Actions representing each of
the buttons hence, the selection of  each screen were defined. The actions are all
defined in the same way: when an action is triggered, for example sin, the value
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of  the display changes to represent the appropriate screen (in the case bellow, the
Sinotico screen):
[sin] display’=Sinotico
As some navigation buttons do not always appear in the screen, some restric-
tions have to be made in order to represent this behaviour. The action sin for
example, is not available in the access screen, when the system is blocked, and in
the exit screen. To represent that, we need to add a permission statement, saying
when the action sin can be triggered.
per(sin) -> !(display in {acessoSis,acessoSev,Bloqueio,Escolha,Final})
Other actions are the opposite. They are only available in the access screens. The
difference is only in the permission statement.
There is a particular action (executar) that appears in three of  the screens only.
The difference to the other actions is that it behaves differently according to the
current screen. The permission statement is similar, but the definition of  the
action(s) needs to be different. When the screen is in Escolha the next screen
after the action is acessoSev, when the screen is either acessoSev or Bloqueio then
the next screen in Principal. This behaviour is captured by the following axioms:
per(executar) -> (display=Escolha | display=acessoSev | display=Bloqueio)
display=Escolha -> [executar] display’=acessoSev
(display=acessoSev | display=Bloqueio) -> [executar] display’=Principal
As we see above the permission statement is quite similar to the previous one.
For the action, we wrote two modal axioms. The right side of  the implications in the
modal axioms (e.g. [executar] display’=acessoSev) is similar to the other actions,
the left side (e.g. display=Escolha) is the guard that defines the conditions under
which the action is defined (by that particular axiom).
To finalise the modelling of  the navigation between screens we only need to
define which is the first screen of  the system. This is done by adding the initializa-
tion axiom bellow.
[] display=acessoSis
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5.3 Modelling the variables and the screens
Modelling navigation between screens was relatively straightforward the next
step was to model the screens. Since each of  the screens presents information
about a specific aspect of  the system (particular cases are the alerts and warning
screens that show lists of  variables in alert/alarm), the first step was to model,
in a general way, the behaviour of  a single variable. Then, modelling a screen was
the aggregation of  a relevant number of  variables, with any additional actions and
control logic.
5.3.1 Variables
A variable has a value which can change over time, a colour, and an associated
characteristic (fixed or blinking). The value of  the variable changes according to
some underlying system characteristic (e.g. temperature of  some specific device).
The TMT screen has the more complex variables featuring characteristics such
working limits, description, and measurement units. In fact, the variables in the
other screens can be derived from TMT screen ones as they only have some of  their
attributes. To capture all that behaviour we designed the tmtVariable Interactor,
which represents a variable of  the TMT screen.
types
Int = 0..5
Unit = {YES,NO,VOLT}
Colour = {yellow, red, green}
Characteristic = {Fixed, Blink}
interactor tmtVariable
attributes
supAlertLim: Int
infAlertLim: Int
supAlarmLim: Int
infAlarmLim: Int
value: Int
colour: Colour
unit: Unit
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critical: boolean
characteristic: Characteristic
actions
setValue(Int)
The Int (integer) type is defined as the values from 0 to 5. Initially was defined
from 0 to 10. For our study what is relevant is that we can set a certain integer
value for the different states (alert, alarm), so the smaller range is enough. The
types Unit, Colour and Characteristic are enumerations with the possible values for
the corresponding attributes (unit, colour and characteristic).
As described in the user manual, there are four attributes pertaining to the
working limits: supAlertLim (superior alert limit), infAlertLim (inferior alert limit),
supAlarmLim (superior alarm limit) and infAlarmLim (inferior alarm limit). Then
we have the attribute value which represents the value displayed by the variable at
each moment, colour which is the colour being used to display the variable, unit
represents the unit of  the value, critical which states if  the variable is critical, and
the blinking characteristic defined by the characteristic attribute.
Regarding actions, the action setValue updates the value of  the variable. This
is the only action needed in this interactor. A first attempt to define it kept all
attributes, other than the value, unchanged, as shown the above expression.
[setValue(_v)] value’ = _v &
keep(supAlertLim, infAlertLim, supAlarmLim,
infAlarmLim, unit, colour, characteristic)
Although the EV allows to set the working limits, we did not model that feature
for performance reasons in the verification. In Section 7 we explore those issues
further.
The definition above, however, is too simplistic. Changes to the variable’s value
can cause alarms or alerts, which in turn can be acknowledged, or not, by the
operator. A variable has the colour red and blinks, when its value is in alarm (i.e.
the value falls inside the alarm limits), has not been acknowledged by the operator,
and is critical. Naturally, since this condition must always hold, it can be said that
it is an invariant of  the system’s behaviour. However, we did not use invariants for
this condition, as will be explained in the next section. Instead, we used guards
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on the modal axioms. Hence, for the condition just described the axiom above
becomes:
[setValue(_v)]
((_v < infAlarmLim) | (_v > supAlarmLim) & critical)
-> value’ = _v & colour’ = red & error’ = Lim & alarmState’ = AlaNRec
& characteristic’ = Blink & keep(supAlertLim,infAlertLim,supAlarmLim,
infAlarmLim,unit,critical,alertState)
The difference to the previous definition is that now we have specified changes
to colour and characteristic, and we have introduced new variables error, alarmState
and alertState. The guard states under which conditions this particular axiom
applies. When the guard is true, a new error is triggered, the colour and the
characteristic become red and blink, respectively, and the alarm state is set to
non-acknowledged (AlaNRec). Besides this specific axioms, there are four others,
defined under the same principle. Together, the axioms cover all the conditions
over the working limits and critical condition of  the variable expressed in the users’
manual.
The definition of  the new variables mentioned above are added to the tmtVari-
able Interactor as:
types
...
Error = {Lim,nil}
State = {AleRec,AleNRec,AlaRec,AlaNRec,Good}
interactor tmtVariable
attributes
...
error: Error
alarmState: State
alertState: State
The variable error records what kind of  error has been detected, and the varia-
bles alarmState and alertState the state of  the alarms and alerts, respectively.
Because the type State has all the possible states for alarms and alerts, we must
constrain the possible value of  the alarm and alert state variables, with invariants
as seen below.
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(alarmState!=AleNRec) & (alarmState!=AleRec)
(alertState!=AlaNRec) & (alertState!=AlaRec)
5.3.2 Screens
A model of  the TMT screen can now be created by aggregating instances of  the
tmtVariable interactor. The TMT screen has a table with more than 30 variables.
Its function is to allow the monitoring of  the variables, and as such, there are no
actions for the user to perform in the screen itself. However, similarly to variables,
the button providing access to this screen (indeed all the buttons providing access
to the different screens) has a colour and a blinking characteristic. Two attributes
to represent them are added to the model, resulting in the following Interactor:
types
Id = {BD1A}
...
interactor TMT
aggregates
tmtVariable via BD1_A
attributes
characteristic: Characteristic
colour: Colour
actions
setValue2(Id,Int)
In this example only one variable (BD1_A) was aggregated to the Interactor.
Note that while the screen does not have any action for the user to use, the
Interactor defines setValue2 action. This is an internal action used to set the values
of  the aggregated variables. It was defined to support the coordination invariants
in the main Interactor. Furthermore, the Id type was defined as the enumeration
of  all button names (in this simple illustrative case only one). This enables the
definition of setValue2 to be generic. By being parameterized on the name of  the
button, the action can be defined to set the value of  any button.
The working principle of  the colour and characteristic attributes for the screens’
access buttons is similar to that of  the variables. The button is red and blinks when
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at least one critical variable of  the screen is in non-acknowledged alarm. As with
the variables, the buttons have four more conditions related to the alarm and alert
states of  the variables contained in the screen. The idea is that the most serious
condition (alert or alarm) prevails.
In this case of  a single variable we can write the following invariants which
directly express each of  the rules in the manual:
BD1_A.colour = red -> (colour = red & characteristic = BD1_A.characteristic)
(BD1_A.colour = yellow & BD1_A.characteristic = Blink) ->
(colour = yellow & characteristic = Blink)
(BD1_A.colour = yellow & BD1_A.characteristic = Fixed) ->
(colour = yellow & characteristic = Fixed)
(BD1_A.colour = green) -> (colour = green & characteristic = Fixed)
For a single variable, we are able to simply say that the colour of  the button is
the same as the variable. The same applied to the characteristic. With more than
one variables the invariant becomes larger and more complex, but the principle is
the same. Note that while we could simplify the axioms, leaving them thus makes
for a clearer connection to the manual.
Regarding the setValue2 action, we need to synchronize it with the BD1_A.setVal-
ue action. That is, if  the variables changes value so should the access button. A
first, tentative, definition is simple:
[setValue2(BD1A,_v)] BD1_A.value’ = _v
With this definition we are actually stating that when the set in the screen is
triggered, the set in the variable is triggered too (because the value of  the variable
is being updated). In fact, the system does not work in this way, the system sets
the variable and the screen is updated accordingly. We can make this clear by
using invariants and permission axioms to express, and force, that when a variable
sets his value the screen performs the same action, as shown in the following
expression:
effect(BD1_A.setValue(_v)) -> effect(setValue2(BD1A,_v))
per(setValue2(BD1A,_v)) -> effect(BD1_A.setValue(_v))
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The first implication states that when the BD1_A variable sets its value a set
for that variable happens in the screen too (i.e., setValue2 happens when the set
of  the variable happens). The second implication (a permission axiom) states that
setValue2 for BD1_A is only permitted when BD1_A is set (i.e., setValue2 cannot
happen unless the set of  the variable happens).
5.3.3 Alarms and Alerts panels
Aggregating the TMT Interactor to the main Interactor, we now have the naviga-
tion and one screen working. The acknowledgement of  alarms and alerts is done
in the alerts and alarms screens. Hence, we need to add those screens to the
model.
The alarms and alerts screens have a list of  alarms and errors, respectively,
that can be acknowledged by the operator. The same approach used for the TMT
screen was followed: defining alerts or alarms variables, and aggregating them to
create the screens’ models.
The simpler variable is the alert variable:
interactor alertVariable
attributes
state: State
error: Error
actions
recAlert
setState(State)
The alert variable has the attribute error that records the error, and the attribute
state that records the state of  the alert (acknowledged or not). The actions are
recAlert, to acknowledge the alert, and setState, which is used when a new value is
updated in the TMT screen. Because the type State has the states for alarms and
alerts we need to add the following invariant:
(state != AlaNRec & state != AlaRec)
This invariant states that the state of  a alert variable can never be in alarm, be it
acknowledged or non-acknowledged.
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Considering that, as described in the user manual, the only error in the variables
is the out of  limits condition, we can write the following invariants:
(state = AleRec | state = AleNRec) -> error = Lim
(state = Good) -> error = nil
These invariants state that when the variable is in either type of  alert, the error
is due to an out of  limits condition. When a variable is not in alert the error is nil.
The definition of  the action recAlert, is straightforward:
[recAlert] state’ = AleRec & keep(error)
The action recAlert changes the state to an acknowledged alert, and keeps the
error (because the value remains in alert). A constraint is added to the action to
avoid recognizing an alert that is already recognized:
per(recAlert) -> state = AleNRec
This constraint means that the action can only happen when the variable is in
unacknowledged alert.
The definition of setState is simple too:
[setState(_e)] state’ = _e
The variable error is not kept because a error can be triggered. The error’s
invariant above maintain the variable correctly set.
As with the TMT variables, we created an Interactor to aggregate the alert
variables.
interactor ALER
aggregates
alertVariable via BD1_A
attributes
characteristic: Characteristic
colour: Colour
actions
recAlert(Id)
setState(Id,State)
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This Interactor represents the alert screen and has colour and characteristic
(variables colour and characteristic, respectively) in its access button. The invari-
ants that state the behaviour of  the button are the following:
BD1_A.state = Good -> colour = green & characteristic = Fixed
BD1_A.state = AleRec -> (colour = yellow & characteristic = Fixed)
BD1_A.state = AleNRec -> (colour = yellow & characteristic = Blink)
When there is no alert in the screen, the access button becomes green and
does not blink. When there is at least one acknowledge alert the button becomes
yellow and does not blink. Yellow and blinking happens when there is at least
one unacknowledged alert. The invariants are only defined for a variable, the first
and last implication are easily extended to consider more variables. The middle
implication is not so easily extended because of  the precedence of  alerts. The
unacknowledged alert has precedence over the acknowledged alert i.e., if  there is
an acknowledged alert and an unacknowledged alert, the button becomes yellow
and blinks.
The actions’ definitions are similar to those of  the TMT screen Interactor.
effect(recAlert(BD1A)) -> effect(BD1_A.recAlert)
per(recAlert(BD1A)) -> effect(BD1_A.recAlert)
[recAlert(BD1A)] BD1_A.state’ = AleRec & characteristic’ = Fixed & keep(colour)
effect(BD1_A.setState(_e)) -> effect(setState(BD1A,_e))
[setState(BD1A,_e)] BD1_A.state’ = _e
Note that action setState, as setValue2 in the TMT screen, do not keep the
variables colour and characteristic. The invariant above guarantees that the values
of  these variables will be updated as needed.
The alarm screen is similar to this alert screen. The only difference is that
instead of  yellow, the possible color of  the access button is red.
5.3.4 Coordination between the screens
Aggregating the ALER and ALAR Interactors to the main Interactor, we now have
three screens. Previously, in the TMT Interactor, we had not added an action to
acknowledge alarms and alerts. Because the variables in the alert and alarm
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screens are those in the TMT screen, we have to coordinate their values. First, we
added the actions recAlar and recAler to the tmtVariable Interactor.
[recAlar(_e)] alarmState’ = _e & keep(colour,value,supAlertLim,infAlertLim,
supAlarmLim,infAlarmLim,unit,critical,error,alertState)
[recAler(_e)] alertState’ = _e & keep(colour,value,supAlertLim,infAlertLim,
supAlarmLim,infAlarmLim,unit,critical,error,alarmState)
We also added the corresponding actions in the TMT Interactor.
effect(BD1_A.recAlar(_e)) -> effect(recAlar(BD1A,_e))
per(recAlar(BD1A,_e)) -> effect(BD1_A.recAlar(_e))
[recAlar(BD1A,_e)] BD1_A.alarmState’ = _e
effect(BD1_A.recAler(_e)) -> effect(recAler(BD1A,_e))
per(recAler(BD1A,_e)) -> effect(BD1_A.recAler(_e))
[recAler(BD1A,_e)] BD1_A.alertState’ = _e
In order to coordinate the variables in the TMT screen with those in the alerts
and alarms screens, we had to add coordination invariants in the main Interactor.
First, we defined when some action can take effect.
per(monitALAR.setState(_b,_e)) ->
(effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,0))
| effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,1))
| effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,2))
| effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,3))
| effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,4))
| effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,5)))
The action setState, in the alarms screen, can only take effect when the value of
the respective variable is updated. For the alerts screen the same situation occurs
with the acknowledgement actions.
per(monitTMT.recAlar(_v,_e)) -> effect(monitALAR.recAlarm(_v))
per(monitTMT.recAler(_v,_e)) -> effect(monitALER.recAlert(_v))
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The acknowledgement is made only in the alarm and alert panels, it is then
propagated to the other screens as shown in the previous expressions. The alarm
and alert states of  the variables need to be synchronized, as indicated in the
following expressions:
monitTMT.BD1_A.alertState = monitALER.BD1_A.state
monitTMT.BD1_A.alarmState = monitALAR.BD1_A.state
The actions to acknowledge alarms and alerts are done in their respective
screens, so we have to restrict when they can be made (when the relevant screen
is being displayed).
per(monitALAR.recAlarm(_v)) -> display=alar
per(monitALER.recAlert(_v)) -> display=aler
The invariants above assert that, the acknowledgement action can be made
only in their respective screen.
5.3.5 Adding the SIN screen
The model of  a new screen, called SIN, was aggregated to the main Interactor.
It is a screen that contains a large number of  variables. Each variable has only the
value, colour and characteristic. The concept is the same, an Interactor represen-
ting a variable, simpler than the others, and an Interactor representing the SIN
screen with the variables.
interactor sinVariable
attributes
colour: Colour
characteristic: Characteristic
value: Int
actions
setValue(Int)
recAlarAler
axioms
[setValue(_v)] value’ = _v
[recAlarAler] keep(value)
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The SIN Interactor is similar to the others but, besides variables, the screen has
safety relays. An indicator in each relay indicates whether it can be released or
not. These relays were not modelled with dedicated Interactors, as the variables
were. Because they can be in one of  two states only, and do not have any associated
colour or characteristic, they were modelled as booleans directly in the SIN Interac-
tor. Additionally, the SIN screen can be set to automatic mode.
interactor SIN
aggregates
sinVariable via BD1_A
attributes
RS_A_4C: boolean
automatic: boolean
colour: Colour
characteristic: Characteristic
lib_RS_A_4C: boolean
actions
setValue2(Id,Int)
setRS_A_4C(boolean)
setAutomatic
setManual
recAlarAler(Id)
libReles
inibReles
The actions setValue2 and recAlarAler help simplify the synchronization invari-
ants. The setRS_A_4C action changes the safety relay’s state. The actions setAuto-
matic and setManual set and unset the automatic mode. The libReles and inibReles
actions activate and deactivate the release indication of  the safety relays. We can
note bellow that the safety relay RS_A_4C, can only be set to true if  the release
sign (lib_RS_A_4C) is true.
per(setRS_A_4C(true)) -> lib_RS_A_4C
[setRS_A_4C(_b)] RS_A_4C’ = _b & keep(automatic,lib_RS_A_4C)
The action definition is done with a typical model axiom, to arm or disarm the
safety relay, but arming is only possible if  the release sign is true, as stated in the
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permission axiom in the first line.
To finish our modelling we need to aggregate the SIN Interactor to the main
Interactor, and add the coordination invariants. The invariants are similar to those
above.
5.4 Adding another variable
Until now only one variable was modelled in each of  the screens. Now we will
see the modelling effort needed to add a new variable. First we need to add the
variables to each of  the screens. In the Interactor SIN we need to aggregate a new
sinVariable Interactor, and the respective coordination invariants and actions.
types
Id = {BD1A,tensaoBD1A}
...
interactor SIN
aggregates
sinVariable via BD1_A
sinVariable via tensaoBD1_A
...
axioms
...
effect(tensaoBD1_A.setValue(_v)) -> effect(setValue2(tensaoBD1A,_v))
per(setValue2(tensaoBD1A,_v)) -> effect(tensaoBD1_A.setValue(_v))
effect(tensaoBD1_A.recAlarAler) -> effect(recAlarAler(tensaoBD1A))
per(recAlarAler(tensaoBD1A)) -> effect(tensaoBD1_A.recAlarAler)
[recAlarAler(tensaoBD1A)] keep(RS_A_4C,automatic,lib_RS_A_4C)
[setValue2(tensaoBD1A,_v)] tensaoBD1_A.value’ = _v
& keep(automatic,RS_A_4C,lib_RS_A_4C)
Recall that the actions setValue2 and recAlarAler receive an Id as parameter. It
is then necessary to add the new id to the type. The invariants and the actions are
copies of  the existing ones for the BD1_A variable. The part that grows more, as
more variables are added, is the invariants that changes the colour of  the screen
access button.
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((BD1_A.colour = red & BD1_A.characteristic = Blink) |
(tensaoBD1_A.colour = red & tensaoBD1_A.characteristic = Blink))
-> (colour = red & characteristic = Blink)
The button will be red and blinking if  it exists at least one variable which is red
and blinking.
(((BD1_A.colour = red & BD1_A.characteristic != Blink) &
(tensaoBD1_A.colour != red | tensaoBD1_A.characteristic != Blink)) |
((tensaoBD1_A.colour = red & tensaoBD1_A.characteristic != Blink) &
(BD1_A.colour != red | BD1_A.characteristic != Blink)))
-> (colour = red & characteristic = Fixed)
The button will be red and fixed, if  it exists at least one variable which is red and
fixed and, and no variable is red and blinking.
((BD1_A.colour = yellow & BD1_A.characteristic = Blink &
tensaoBD1_A.colour != red) |
(tensaoBD1_A.colour = yellow & tensaoBD1_A.characteristic = Blink &
BD1_A.colour != red))
-> (colour = yellow & characteristic = Blink)
The button will be yellow and blinking, if  exists at least one variable yellow and
blinking and, no one red and blinking or fixed.
(((BD1_A.colour = yellow & BD1_A.characteristic != Blink) &
(tensaoBD1_A.colour != red | (tensaoBD1_A.colour = yellow &
tensaoBD1_A.characteristic != Blink))) |
((tensaoBD1_A.colour = yellow & tensaoBD1_A.characteristic != Blink) &
(BD1_A.colour != red | (BD1_A.colour = yellow &
BD1_A.characteristic != Blink))))
-> (colour = yellow & characteristic = Fixed)
The button will be yellow and fixed, if  exists at least one variable yellow and fixed
and, no one red and blinking or fixed, and yellow and blinking.
(BD1_A.colour = green & tensaoBD1_A.colour = green)
-> (colour = green & characteristic = Fixed)
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The button will be green and fixed, if  all the variables green.
The new variable tensaoBD1_A has a big impact in these invariants, in terms of
the number of  lines and model complexity. It is quite hard to not get lost in such
a large invariant.
For the TMT screen the effort is the same.
interactor TMT
aggregates
tmtVariable via BD1_A
tmtVariable via tensaoBD1_A
...
axioms
...
effect(tensaoBD1_A.setValue(_v)) -> effect(setValue2(tensaoBD1A,_v))
per(setValue2(tensaoBD1A,_v)) -> effect(tensaoBD1_A.setValue(_v))
[setValue2(tensaoBD1A,_v)] tensaoBD1_A.value’ = _v
effect(tensaoBD1_A.recAlar(_e)) -> effect(recAlar(tensaoBD1A,_e))
per(recAlar(tensaoBD1A,_e)) -> effect(tensaoBD1_A.recAlar(_e))
[recAlar(tensaoBD1A,_e)] tensaoBD1_A.alarmState’ = _e
effect(tensaoBD1_A.recAler(_e)) -> effect(recAler(tensaoBD1A,_e))
per(recAler(tensaoBD1A,_e)) -> effect(tensaoBD1_A.recAler(_e))
[recAler(tensaoBD1A,_e)] tensaoBD1_A.alertState’ = _e
The invariants follow the same scheme of  the previous screen.
The screens Alerts is somewhat similar, but a bit simpler.
interactor ALER
aggregates
alertVariable via BD1_A
alertVariable via tensaoBD1_A
...
axioms
effect(recAlert(tensaoBD1A)) -> effect(tensaoBD1_A.recAlert)
per(recAlert(tensaoBD1A)) -> effect(tensaoBD1_A.recAlert)
[recAlert(tensaoBD1A)] tensaoBD1_A.state’ = AleRec &
characteristic’ = Fixed & keep(colour)
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[setState(tensaoBD1A,_e)] tensaoBD1_A.state’ = _e
effect(tensaoBD1_A.setState(_e)) -> effect(setState(tensaoBD1A,_e))
As in the previous screens, the invariants and actions definitions for the ten-
saoBD1_A variable are copies of  the existing ones for the BD1_A variable. The
invariants that changes the colour of  the screen button are simpler too. That is
because in this screens, the button can only take two colours. Green and yellow in
the case of  the alerts screen, and green and red in the case of  the alarms screen.
For the alerts screen the axioms are:
(BD1_A.state = Good & tensaoBD1_A.state = Good)
-> (colour = green & characteristic = Fixed)
((BD1_A.state = AleRec & tensaoBD1_A.state != AleNRec)|
(BD1_A.state != AleNRec & tensaoBD1_A.state = AleRec))
-> (colour = yellow & characteristic = Fixed)
(BD1_A.state = AleNRec | tensaoBD1_A.state = AleNRec)
-> (colour = yellow & characteristic = Blink)
In this screen the effort to change the invariant to consider two variables is not so
complex. In fact it is straightforward to do it. For the alarms screen the new MAL
axioms are analogous.
Lastly, it is necessary to add the coordination invariants in the main Interactor.
Most of  these invariants are defined in such a way that there is no need to change
anything. The ones that need to be added are the following:
monitTMT.tensaoBD1_A.value = monitSIN.tensaoBD1_A.value
monitTMT.tensaoBD1_A.colour = monitSIN.tensaoBD1_A.colour
monitTMT.tensaoBD1_A.characteristic = monitSIN.tensaoBD1_A.characteristic
monitALAR.tensaoBD1_A.state=AlaRec
-> monitTMT.tensaoBD1_A.characteristic = Fixed
monitSIN.RS_A_4C
-> monitTMT.tensaoBD1_A.alertState = monitALER.tensaoBD1_A.state
!monitSIN.RS_A_4C -> monitALER.tensaoBD1_A.state = Good
monitSIN.RS_A_4C
-> monitTMT.tensaoBD1_A.alarmState = monitALAR.tensaoBD1_A.state
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!monitSIN.RS_A_4C -> monitALAR.tensaoBD1_A.state = Good
Most of  these invariants are copies of  the existing ones for the BD1_A variable.
The ones who are different are the last six lines. The alarms and alerts of  the new
variable tensaoBD1_A only appear on the alarms and alerts screens, respectively,
if  the RS_A_4C relay is enabled.
In conclusion most of  the axioms needed to add a new variable to the system
are almost copies the existing axioms. The only aspect that becomes somehow
complex, is the modelling of  how the colour of  the screen buttons changes, in
screens TMT and SIN.
5.5 Variables description
The previous sections focused on describing the resulting models. In order to
provide some insights on how the models were derived from the user manuals, an
example of  modelling the constraints related to the colour and characteristics of
the variables is presented next.
In the manual we have the following statements:
“Blinking yellow: For a critical variable, when the current value of the vari-
able is in non recognized alert (value within the range of alerts), there is no
recognized alarm in the same variable and do not exists the previous crite-
rion. If over the same variable a recognized critical alarm exists, then the
fixed red prevail. For a non critical variable, when the current value of the
variable is in non recognized alarm (value within the range of alarms).”
These statements indicate when some variable becomes yellow and blinking.
Firstly, and because the manual says that when “a recognized critical alarm exists,
fixed red prevail”, we need to split the formalization into two parts. One for when a
recognized critical alarm does not exist, and the variable becomes blinking yellow.
Another for when a recognized critical alarm does exist, in which case the color
and blinking state of  the variable should be kept as they are.
Using the attributes of  the Interactor tmtVariable we can translate the statements
above one by one to MAL. The statement “For a critical variable, when the current
value of the variable is in non recognized alert (value within the range of alerts), there
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is no recognized alarm in the same variable and do not exists the previous criterion.” is
translated to:
critical &
((_v >= infAlarmLim & _v < infAlertLim) |
(_v <= supAlarmLim & _v > supAlertLim)) &
(alarmState != AlaNRec & alarmState != AlaRec)
The part of  the statement “do not exists the previous criterion” means being in
unrecognized alarm, which is defined in the second and third line of  the above
MAL specification. The variable _v is the current value.
The second part of  the statement is “For a non critical variable, when the current
value of the variable is in non recognized alarm (value within the range of alarms).”.
This is translated to:
((_v < infAlarmLim) | (_v > supAlarmLim)) & !critical)
Rearranging the MAL specification produced and incorporating to the action
setValue(_v) the specification becomes:
[setValue(_v)]
(((((_v >= infAlarmLim & _v < infAlertLim) |
(_v <= supAlarmLim & _v > supAlertLim)) & critical)
| (((_v < infAlarmLim) | (_v > supAlarmLim)) & !critical))
& (alarmState != AlaNRec & alarmState != AlaRec))
-> value’ = _v & colour’ = yellow & error’ = Lim & alertState’ = AleNRec
& characteristic’ = Blink & keep(supAlertLim,infAlertLim,supAlarmLim,
infAlarmLim,unity,critical,alarmState)
The statement “If over the same variable exists a recognized critical alarm, then
the fixed red prevail.” produces a specification similar to the previous. The only
difference is in (alarmState != AlaNRec & alarmState != AlaRec) which becomes
(alarmState = AlaNRec | alarmState = AlaRec). Obviously colour and characteristic
are not changed, only the alertState is updated to AleNRec.
5.6 Conclusion
The most interesting aspects of  the EV subsystem, such as the alarms and
alerts, was modelled. During the modelling some simplifications were made, in
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Interactor # attributes # actions # lines
main 1 25 130
sinVariable 3 2 11
SIN 5 7 51
tmtVariable 12 3 42
TMT 2 3 45
alertVariable 2 2 14
ALER 2 2 27
alarmVariable 3 2 15
ALAR 2 2 27
Total 32 48 362
Table 5.1: EV model figures.
order to reduce the verification time. One of  them was the range of  the Int type.
Initially the type was defined from 0 to 10 but, to be able to set alarm and alert
limits, from 0 to 5 was sufficient. The language was expressive enough to model
the EV subsystem. In some cases the language could provide some “syntactic
sugar” to reduce model size and to be easier to maintain.
Adding new variables proved to be not so difficult, with the exception of  the
invariants that changes the colour of  the screen buttons. Those invariants escalated
quickly in size, and because of  that they become quite difficult to maintain or
change.
Table 5.1 compiles some figures (number of  attributes, actions and lines) about
the model, considering the version with two variables. The Interactors main and
tmtVariables are the bigger ones. main because of  the navigation and constraints to
synchronize all the Interactors, and tmtVariables because of  the values of  variables
and control of  the alarms and alerts triggered. The Interactor with more actions
is main with 25, because of  all the buttons to change between screens. The
Interactor with more attributes is tmtVariable with 12, because of  the number of
characteristics that its variables have.
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Chapter 6
CR Subsystem
CR subsystem is the Electric Control Network. It is a subsystem of TPGS
responsible for the testing, simulation and analysis of  the automatic launch se-
quence, and of  a number of  devices in the rocket, before its launch. In the following
sections the modelling of CR subsystem is presented.
6.1 “Business layer”
For modelling this subsystem we had access to a state machine that specifies
when some action can take effect, or not. We could notice that the state machine
works as the “business layer” of  the model. Modelling in MAL being similar to
defining a state machine, its translation to MAL is somehow direct. The state
machine has nine states. A variable (state) is used to represent the current state.
Each state has one or more labelled transition (actions) to other states or to itself.
The actions in the model are the transition labels of  the state machine. Some
transitions have conditions that need to be met in order to be fired. The boolean
variables needed to manage these conditions were identified and represented as
attributes in the Interactor.
types
States = {operationMode,microDisable,microEnable,testRec,simul,
inicSAREC,automaticSeqRec,secureStateRec,inconsistentStateRec}
interactor main
attributes
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state : States
automaticMode : boolean
tstRecPer : boolean
simulPer : boolean
prepPer : boolean
saPer : boolean
saReady : boolean
actions
automatic
manual
criticFailure
inicSimul
endSimul
inicTestRec
endTestRec
recCondSatisfied
enableSa
disableSa
nowSa
restartOp
endSa
prepSaFailure
enableSo
We have represented the state machine in Interactor main in order to reduce
the synchronization effort. As said above, the actual state is represented by the
attribute state, of  type States, which is an enumeration with the nine possible
states. The rest of  the attributes captured the state of  some conditions:
• automaticMode - captures the mode of  the system (true if  automatic, false if
manual);
• tstRecPer - captures if  the tests of CR are enabled or not;
• simulPer - captures if  the simulations of CR are enabled or not;
• prepPer - captures if  the CR preparation is enabled or not;
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• saPer - captures if  the automatic sequence is enabled or not;
• saReady - captures if  the TPGS is ready for the automatic sequence or not.
All this variables are typed as boolean.
In the actions defined below the attributes are the transitions of  the state
machine. Each transition (action) can only happen in a particular state or set of
states, for example the action criticFailure can only happen in the states microEn-
able, inicSAREC and automaticSeqRec. Such condition is expressed as follows:
per(criticFailure) -> state in {microEnable,inicSAREC,automaticSeqRec}
This expression means that the action criticFailure is permitted only if state (i.e.
current state) is equal to microEnable, inicSAREC or automaticSeqRec. For the
other actions the process is similar.
We have defined the states from where the transitions “leave”, now we need to
define to what state they “go”, and what they “change”. Most of  the transitions
(actions) have different behaviour according to the actual state. The way to repre-
sent that is using guards. Consider, for example, the criticalFailure transition
(action):
state=microEnable ->
[criticFailure] tstRecPer’=true & simulPer’=true & saPer’=false
& keep(automaticMode,state,prepPer,saReady)
state=inicSAREC ->
[criticFailure] state’=microEnable & saPer’=false & saReady’=false
& simulPer’=true & tstRecPer’=true & keep(automaticMode,prepPer)
state=automaticSeqRec ->
[criticFailure] state’=secureStateRec & saPer’=false & prepPer’=false
& keep(automaticMode,tstRecPer,simulPer,saReady)
Above we have three expressions, one for each state (microEnable, inicSAREC
and automaticSeqRec, respectively). The first expression states that when the
current state is microEnable, and the transition (action) criticFailure happens, the
tests and simulations of CR are enabled, the automatic sequence is disabled, and
the state and the remaining variables do not change. Visually the state machine
evolves to the same state.
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The second expression asserts that when the current state is inicSAREC, and
the transition (action) criticFailure happens, the tests and simulations of CR are
enabled, the automatic sequence is disabled, the TPGS is not ready for the auto-
matic sequence, the state machine evolves to the state microEnable and the remaining
variables do not change.
The third expression states that when the current state is automaticSeqRec, and
the transition (action) criticFailure happens, the automatic sequence is disabled,
the CR preparation is disabled, the state machine evolves to the state secureState-
Rec and the remaining variables do not change.
The remaining transitions (actions) were modelled following the same principle.
To finish the ”business layer” we defined the initial state and the values of  the
attributes:
[] state=microEnable & automaticMode = false & tstRecPer = false
& simulPer = false & prepPer = false & saPer = false & saReady = false
The initial state of  the state machine is microEnable, the CR is in manual mode and
all the attributes are disabled. With this expression we have the “business layer”
modelled.
6.2 Navigation between screens
Because the CR and the EV are subsystems of  the TPGS, the navigation is
uniform in all subsystems. The modelling of  the navigation between screens was
similar to the one modelled in the EV subsystem. We added the attribute display
to the main Interactor, typed as Screens, and the actions to navigate between the
panels, as seen below:
types
...
Screens = {Voo, TestSim, DiagEsq, MonitTel, MonitUmb, ...}
interactor main
attributes
...
[vis] display: Screens
actions
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...
voo
tst
esq
tmt
tmu
...
Some of  the panels are the same as in the EV, like the TMT, TMU, Alarms and
Alerts panels. The modelling of  the actions to navigate between the screens was
similar:
per(voo) -> !(display in {acessoSis,acessoRec,Bloqueio,Escolha,Final})
[voo] display’=Voo & keep(state,automaticMode,tstRecPer,simulPer,prepPer,
saPer,saReady)
The first line is a permission statement and the second line is the definition of
the behaviour of  action voo. Like in EV the actions of  navigation only change the
display. The other navigation action were modelled analogously.
6.3 Variables
As in EV, CR has a set of  variables that are monitored. We can reuse the tmt-
Variable Interactor, because the behaviour of  the variables in the CR subsystem is
the same as the EV. Although we had modelled the variables in the EV model, we
did not reuse the Interactor. For this model, only the state of  the variables was
relevant (i.e. if  in alarm, alert or in normal state). The tmtVariable Interactor has
that characteristic modelled, but it also has many other unnecessary features. We
have modelled a simplified version to reduce verification time.
types
VarState = {Good,Alarm,Alert}
interactor VOOVariable
attributes
state : VarState
actions
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setState(VarState)
axioms
[] state = Good
per(setState(_s)) -> state != _s
[setState(_e)] state’ = _e
For the EV model a variable has only the attribute state that records if  the
variable is in alarm, alert or normal (Good) states. It has the action setState(Var-
State), which is the equivalent to the setValue in the tmtVariable Interactor of  the
EV model. The variable “begins” in the state Good, as the first axiom asserts.
The line above the action definition are the condition to not change the state of
the variable to the same state. It is defined for all the variable’s possible states
(Good, Alarm and Alert) by the variable _s. The definition of  the setState action is
straightforward.
6.4 Voo Screen
In this screen the operator can perform actions of  preparation for the launch,
and monitor the variables and results of  the automatic sequence, whether in
testing or during actual launch setting. This screen has some variables, so we
need to aggregate instances of  the VOOVariable Interactor to the Interactor that
models the screen (Voo).
types
...
Id = {IRECP}
VarState = {Good,Alarm,Alert}
MSIState = {nil,INICIO,PRONTO}
INFOState = {nil,INIC,COMPL}
interactor VOO
aggregates
VOOVariable via irecP
attributes
aquec : MSIState
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state : States
automaticMode : boolean
stateInfo: INFOState
actions
stateSync(States)
aquecMSI
doneAquecMSI
sendInfo
doneSendInfo
automaticSync(boolean)
Some attributes on Interactor VOO are copies of  attributes in the main Interac-
tor, due to the problem of  an included Interactor not having access to attributes
and actions of  the including Interactor. The attributes state and automaticMode are
examples of  that, and the action stateSync and automaticSync are the respective
actions to synchronize the values between the two Interactors. The definition of
them is similar to the ones in the EV.
[stateSync(_s)] state’ = _s & keep(aquec,stateInfo,automaticMode)
[automaticSync(_b)] automaticMode’ = _b & keep(aquec,stateInfo,state)
They update the respective values and do not change all the others. Then in the
root Interactor (main) is necessary to add the invariants to maintain the synchroni-
zation.
The attributes aquec and stateInfo are used to record the state of  two actions
that can be done in this screen, heating the MSI and sending the PASS archive
data to SOAB-CDB, respectively. The first action (heating the MSI) is modelled by
the actions aquecMSI and doneAquecMSI.
The semantics for the actions was derived from the user manual as already
illustrated. The manual states that it is only possible to heat the MSI when there
is no variable in alarm or alert and the system is in automatic mode. Additionally,
if  the MSI is already heating when the command to heat the MSI is issued, the
heating stops.
per(aquecMSI) -> (irecP.state = Good
& !(state in {operationMode,microDisable,inconsistentStateRec}))
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aquec = nil -> [aquecMSI] aquec’ = INICIO & keep(state,stateInfo,automaticMode)
aquec != nil -> [aquecMSI] aquec’ = nil & keep(state,stateInfo,automaticMode)
The first statement asserts that is only permitted to perform the action if  the
variable is not in alarm or alert and the system is in the states where the automatic
mode is not manual. The second line is the definition of  the action aquecMSI when
the “display” that show the state of  heating the MSI (aquec) is empty. In that case
the attribute aquec changes to INICIO, meaning that the heating began. The third
line is the same action but when aquec is not empty, it stops the heating and clears
the aquec attribute.
The other action was defined to model the end of  heating the MSI:
per(doneAquecMSI) -> (irecP.state = Good & aquec = INICIO)
[doneAquecMSI] aquec’ = PRONTO & keep(state,stateInfo,automaticMode)
The permission statement in this case is that the variables are still not in alarm
or alert and the heating has already started (aquec = INICIO). The definition of
the action is to change the aquec attribute to PRONTO, and keep all the other
attributes. Note that this action in the system is not triggered by the user. It can
be seen as an event.
The second action, sending the PASS archive data, is somewhat similar. It is
modelled by the sendInfo action, and as in the heating of  the MSI, an action that
models the completion of  sending the PASS archive is defined.
per(sendInfo) -> (stateInfo in {nil,COMPL}
& !(state in {operationMode,microDisable,inconsistentStateRec}))
[sendInfo] stateInfo’ = INIC & keep(state,aquec,automaticMode)
per(doneSendInfo) -> stateInfo = INIC
[doneSendInfo] stateInfo’ = COMPL & keep(state,aquec,automaticMode)
The first line asserts that the action sendInfo can only take effect if  it is not already
sending the archive, and the system is in automatic mode. The third line is
a straightforward definition that changes the “display” of  this action (stateInfo
attribute) to INIC, stating that the sending began. The fourth and fifth lines are
related to the completion of  sending the archive. The fourth line states that the
action doneSendInfo can only take effect if  the sending has already started. The
fifth line is the definition of  the action, similar to the previous.
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When these two actions are completed with success other action is trigged in
the business layer (recCondSatisfied). In order to trigger the action recCondSatis-
fied, the following invariant was added in the main Interactor:
saPer = true -> (monitVOO.aquec = PRONTO & monitVOO.stateInfo = COMPL)
The action recCondSatisfied is triggered when the system is ready for the auto-
matic sequence, and the attribute saPer states that. The invariant assures that
the attribute saPer is true, only when the heating of  the MSI and the sending the
PASS archive are completed with success.
6.5 Automatic Sequence
The automatic sequence is monitored in this screen by six rectangles, that
display information according to the evolution of  the events of  the automatic se-
quence. Hence, six attributes were added to the VOO Interactor in order to model
the automatic sequence.
types
...
Int = 0..11
FGState = {nil,COMAND}
ALGORITState = {nil,INIC}
...
attributes
...
saState : Int
prepMSI : MSIState
habilFG : FGState
inicBR3 : FGState
com1PSR : FGState
navon : FGState
algo1E : ALGORITState
actions
...
inicPrep
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inicPrepMSI
habilFontGir
inicAlg
verFontGir
comPSR1
verPSR1
comMSIReady
verMSI
comInicNav
inicNavMSI
The automatic sequence was modelled as a ordered sequence of  events (in this
case actions). Beside the attributes to record the state of  the six rectangles of  the
screen, the attribute saState, an integer used to define the sequence, was also
added. saState starts as zero. The first event of  the sequence was modelled as
follow:
per(inicPrep) -> (aquec=PRONTO & stateInfo=COMPL & saState=0
& state=automaticSeqRec)
[inicPrep] saState’ = 1 & keep(aquec,state,stateInfo,automaticMode,
prepMSI,habilFG,inicBR3,com1PSR,navon,algo1E)
The automatic sequence can only start when the MSI is heated and the PASS
archive is sent. The first line asserts that the inicPrep action can only take effect if
the MSI is heated, the PASS archive is sent, the state of  the system (state) is in the
automatic sequence and the attribute of  the automatic sequence order is equal to
zero. The action simply increments the attribute saState, so that the model might
be able to accept the next event in the automatic sequence. Notice that there
are now more attributes. The new attributes were added to the keep operation of
the previously defined actions of  this Interactor, so that they would not randomly
change their value.
The next event is beginning the preparation of  the MSI (inicPrepMSI). For this
event the permission statement is simpler, it is only necessary to check that the
automatic sequence order variable is equal to one. That statement is in the first
line below.
per(inicPrepMSI) -> (saState = 1)
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[inicPrepMSI] prepMSI’ = INICIO & saState’ = 2 & keep(aquec,state,
stateInfo,automaticMode,habilFG,inicBR3,com1PSR,navon,algo1E)
As in the previous action the attribute saState is incremented, besides that the
“rectangle” prepMSI changes to INICIO, stating that the preparation of  the MSI
has began.
The remaining events were modelled in an analogous manner.
Because the VOOVariable was added to this Interactor there is the need to
define the action that sets the state of  the aggregated variable.
effect(irecP.setState(_e)) -> effect(setState(IRECP,_e))
per(setState(IRECP,_e)) -> effect(irecP.setState(_e))
[setState(IRECP,_e)] irecP.state = _e & keep(aquec,state,...)
This definition is similar to ones defined in the EV model. The first two lines
defines when this action happens and how it synchronizes. The last line is the
definition of  the action, which updates the state of  the variable. Note that it
is necessary to add the action setState(Id,VarState) to the list of  actions in this
Interactor.
To finalize, we aggregated this Interactor to the main and added the invariants
state = monitVOO.state and automaticMode = monitVOO.automaticMode to synchro-
nize the values of state and automaticMode. We now have the CR subsystem with
the Voo screen.
6.6 Conclusion
The CR subsystem was modelled differently when compared to the EV. For
this model we had access to a document that had a state machine, explaining
when some action had permission to be happen, and how the subsystem evolved.
Other difference is the abstraction made in the variables. Because several aspects
concerning variables had been tested in the previous model, this model was re-
duced to the essential, the state of  the variables (alarms and alerts), and the
actual value of  the variables was not considered. How to add new variables to the
model was not discussed, but it is analogous to the EV model. In fact it is simpler
because, due two the simplifications, the complex invariants that escalated quickly
in terms of  complexity are not needed in this case.
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Interactor # attributes # actions # lines
main 8 41 193
VOOVariable 1 1 11
VOO 11 18 92
Total 20 60 296
Table 6.1: CR model figures.
Table 6.1 compiles some figures (number of  attributes, actions and lines) about
the model, considering a single variable. The Interactores main and VOO are the
bigger ones. The main because of  the navigation and the “business layer” that
controls when some actions can happen, and the VOO because of  the action of
the screen and the automatic sequence. The Interactor with more actions is main
with 41, because of  all the buttons to change between screens, and the “business
layer” that has several actions too. The Interactor with more attributes is VOO with
11, because of  the variables to control the automatic sequence and the actions of
that screen.
Chapter 7
Analysis
In this Chapter the analysis performed on the models is described. Some
properties that were tested and their results are presented, as well as verification
times in the machines used. An analysis is also made of  the IVY Workbench and
some improvements to the tool is suggested.
7.1 Model Analysis
During modelling, we checked some properties in order to verify if  the model
was being properly designed, as described by the user manual, and more than
that, to verify whether the system had errors or problems. As soon as we modelled
the TMT panel with one variable, we started testing whether the model behaved
as intended. To that end, we defined some CTL properties related to navigation.
One example of  this is the property:
!EF(display=Final)
This property states that there is no situation (or systems state) where the
variable display is equal to Final — i.e., the system does not reach the exit panel.
The result was a counterexample (see figure 7.1) illustrating the reaching of  the
exit panel, which is what we expected. The trace, in this case presented using the
tabular representation, shows the sequence of  actions [enter, executar (execute),
executar, fim (end)] and the changes they produce in the system state.
We have tested properties related to the actions too. For example, verifying if
a variable can be in alert. In order to get counterexamples we wrote the inverse
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Figure 7.1: Trace of  the counterexample (main Interactor only).
property i.e., for all states where the variable BD1_A is in normal state (its colour
is green), there is no next state where the variable is in alarm (colour red).
AG(monitTMT.BD1_A.colour = green -> !EX (monitTMT.BD1_A.colour = red))
As expected, the property was model checked as false, and a counterexample was
generated.
After analysing the counterexample, illustrated in figure 7.2 (in this case using
a state machine-like representation), we thought it was spurious. It highlighted
a situation where the variable colour was red (rightmost column, colour = red),
but under an acknowledged alert condition (state = AleRec). According to our
understanding of  what had been modelled, such situation should not be possible.
Another strange aspect of  the counterexample was that the limit variables were all
being changed to zero (when they should always keep their values).
After analysing the conditions in the operation manual we found that it did not
define what happens to a non critical alert, which was the case in the counterexam-
ple. Because of  that, the behaviour of  the system under that particular condition
was not being defined in the model. Consequently the model checker was consid-
ering any possible behaviour as legal, which meant that variables where in practice
being changed randomly. With this property, we found a gap in the definition of
the alerts and alarms in the operation manual of  the system. After discussing this
with an operator of  the system, it was concluded that indeed the manual was not
accurate in the treatment of  these conditions. No other error was found in the
other properties we tested up to date.
7.2 Performance considerations
In this phase, an additional concern was related to the performance of  the
verification, and how different modelling approaches impacted on it. We mentioned
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Figure 7.2: Trace of  the counterexample.
in Section 4.4 the use of  invariants vs. guards in the definition of  how button
colors and blinking characteristics change as the variables’ values change. We
experienced that invariants make the model checker consume more memory during
the verification, as well as taking more time to perform it. Hence, we decided that,
mainly in the action setValue of  the tmtVariable Interactor, we should use guards
instead of  invariants.
We have described the simpler versions of  the models (considering very few
variables). Our experience adding more detail to the model shows that this is
just a case of  adding more variables and the corresponding axioms. Given the
approach we have devised, this addition has not particular complexity in terms of
writing the models. The CR model is relatively simpler than EV, mainly due to the
simplification which has been done in the variables.
In order to explore the impact of  adding variables to the CR model, multiple
versions of  this model (i.e. with different numbers of  variables) were use to test
the property:
AG(automaticMode=TRUE -> !EF(monitVOO.action = inicNavMSI))
The goal was to obtain a path, as counter example, that illustrates the steps
of  the automatic sequence (because of  the size, the trace is not presented). This
property means that for all paths where automaticMode is equal to TRUE (which
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Figure 7.3: Verification times of  CR model.
is always the case), there is no future state where the action of  the monitVOO
Interactor is equal to inicNavMSI (which is the last action of  the automatic se-
quence). The verification times of  this property in various model versions are
illustrated in figure 7.3. The properties were tested on two machines. A Macbook
Pro with an Intel Core 2 Duo P8800 at 2.66 GHz with 8Gb of  ram, and a PC with
an Intel Core i7 960 at 3.20GHz with 24Gb of  ram. The machines have different
operating system, Mac OS X and Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard respectively.
The verification times were fairly quick, but we were expecting a higher difference
between the machines. The biggest difference was almost ten seconds in the
model with four variables. The results show that the addition of  variables increases
the verification time nonlinearly. In this model this is noticed especially from three
to four variables, which increases verification time by almost thirty seconds in the
Mac.
Three versions of  the EV model were created, with two, three and four variables,
respectively. First the property above was tested, in the two variables model, with
Mac. The results are illustrated in Figure 7.4. The verification time was fairly
higher than for the CR model. This was what we expected due to the model being
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Figure 7.4: Verification times of  EV model.
more complex (mainly because it included a more detailed treatment of  variables).
The three variables version of  the model was in verification for 24 hours and did
not produce any result. In fact, after a couple of  hours the model checker was
consuming the entire computer memory (8Gb) and CPU load was very low.
After this result we tried to verify the property in the PC with 24Gb of  ram.
In the PC the model was in verification during a weekend, and no result was
produced. Like the Mac the model checker was consuming the entire computer
memory (24Gb). Because of  that, the EV model with three and four variables was
not verified. This shows that applying appropriate abstraction to the models can
have a huge impact on the feasibility of  the analysis.
Although the addition of  more variables does not add much to the system in
terms of  verification, because they all behave the same way, a model of  the CR
subsystem with 42 variables was developed. That model is available at the HCIs-
pecs web site1.
1http://hcispecs.di.uminho.pt
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7.3 Tool analysis
From the modelling made in the IVY Workbench, a number of  possible improve-
ments to the tool were identified that could help when applying it to the modelling
and verification of  “large” and complex systems such as was the case here. Some
improvements are language enhancements, which help to express more easily
some of  the logic of  the system. Others are suggestions of  new plugins/func-
tionalities that can improve the verification functionalities of  the tool.
7.3.1 Language enhancements and limitations
In models designed with an hierarchy of  Interactors there is, most of  the time,
a need to synchronise Interactors (actions and variables), as was seen in Section
4.4. That synchronization is done with constraints, typically on the root Interactor
of  those we want to synchronise. The language already has some ways to simplify
(reduce the complexity of) expressing the constraints. For example, the coordina-
tion expression:
per(monitTMT.recAlar(_v,_e)) -> effect(monitALAR.recAlarm(_v))
is a simplification of  writing all the instances of monit.recAlar and monitALAR.rec-
Alarm. This would be writing axioms such as:
per(monitTMT.recAlar(BD1A,AlaRec)) -> effect(monitALAR.recAlarm(BD1A))
for all the combinations of  the action parameters values. But it is not possible to
simplify this kind of  expressions all the time, for example this expression:
per(monitALAR.setState(_b,_e)) ->
(effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,0))
| effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,1))
| effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,2))
| effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,3))
| effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,4))
| effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,5)))
The obvious simplification would be:
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per(monitALAR.setState(_b,_e)) -> (effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,_v))
This simplification cannot be done because currently it is not possible to use a
variable in the right side of  the implication or equivalence, that is not in the left
side. What we need is a simple cartesian product of  the possible actions. In this
example the simplification is not too significant, but in case of _v be from 0 to
100, the simplification is welcome.
In the case of _v ranging from 0 to 100, we may want to express parts of  the
set 0 to 100. As an example:
per(monitALAR.setState(_b,_e)) -> (effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,_v1))
per(monitALAR.setState(_b,_e)) -> (effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,_v2))
The first expression with _v1 be from 0 to 49, and the second with _v2 be from
50 to 100. One way to express this could be adding a where keyword to define the
variable.
per(monitALAR.setState(_b,_e)) ->
(effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,_v1)) where _v1 in {0..49}
per(monitALAR.setState(_b,_e)) ->
(effect(monitTMT.setValue2(_b,_v2)) where _v2 in {50..100}
This solution is similar to the “syntactic sugar” used in set’s inclusion with the
keyword in. For non consecutive sets, for example a set ranging from 0 to 20 and
ranging from 60 to 70, is easy to include the union keyword to express that (e.g.
_v1 in {0..20} union {60..70}).
The synchronisation between Interactors is, in most of  the cases, a necessity
because of  the tree-like compositional nature of  the language as seen in Chapters
3 and 4. Figure 7.5 illustrates how direct communication between Interactors at
the same level in the hierarchy is currently not possible to achieve. In the figure
the variables varA from the Interactors Interactor1 and Interactor2 represent the
same value. invCoordination represents coordination invariants, which in this case
would coordinate the variables varA of Interactor1 and Interactor2. Beyond that, we
would also have to coordinate actions setA of  those Interactors. A good example
of  the extra code to express this kind of  communication is described in Section
5.3.4.
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Figure 7.5: Communication between Interactors.
A solution to allowing communication between Interactors at the same level is
not so simple as was a solution for the previous issue. The MAL model is compiled
to SMV which has a tree-like compositional nature language, like MAL. A possibility
would be to further explore the coordination based approach to composing Interac-
tors proposed in [12, 13].
7.3.2 New tool features
As seen in Section 2.4 the IVY Workbench is a plugin-based tool. IVY can easily
be extended with more features as plugins. One plugin that was developed was a
simulator called WildAniMal. The simulator proved to be quite useful for checking
basic aspects like our mental model against the model itself. Now it is an essential
plugin to test paths that we think may have potential problems. Until now, we
would have to define a formula that returns a counterexample with the path that
we want to test, which most of  the times is quite difficult.
A problem we face after modelling large systems, as the one modelled, is the
verification time. IVY Workbench uses the symbolic model checker NuSMV2. As the
model was growing, the verification time was growing in a bigger proportion. For
large systems, theorem provers are typically used instead of  model checkers [14].
They require less computational power, but are usually considered to require more
2http://nusmv.fbk.eu/
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expertise from the part of  the user, as the proofs are developed semi-automatically
only (while in model checking the proof  process is fully automated). Nevertheless,
developing the models to a point where model checking is feasible (finding the right
abstractions and the right encoding of  the properties) is also a skillful process that
requires very specific expertise.
Changing the tool, in this case the compiler, to compile to more than just a SMV
specification would be a great improvement for the tool. A good solution would
be the compiler generate different specifications for several model checkers or
theorem provers. In the verification phase the user would decide which model
checker or theorem prover to use. This kind of  tool architecture is similar to SAL,
and makes the tool more versatile. Some research is being made in order to
generate PVS specifications to be applied to the PVS3 theorem prover.
7.4 Conclusion
With the verification of  properties we ended up finding an error in the manual.
We were not expecting to find any kind of  error, both because the modelling had
been done from the manual, and because the system has been in use for many
years. Unfortunately, it was not possible to verify the more complex models, due
to the memory consumption of  the model checker.
Concerning the expressiveness of  the language, it was possible to model all the
aspects of  the subsystems. Still, some “syntactic sugar” could be added, in order
to make some expressions simpler to write.
3http://pvs.csl.sri.com/
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
Typical Interactive Systems’ evaluation techniques are just not enough for Safety
Critical Interactive Systems. Such techniques can not verify all interactions, wheth-
er through forgetfulness, being manually applied, or because that would require
too many resources. In many cases it will be simply impossible to check every
interaction. We have explored how a mathematically rigorous method (model
checking) can be the way to verify all the interaction, and to do that automatically.
State space explosion is a serious problem with model checking, and abstraction
of  the system during the modelling phase is the way to reduce the state space
to be checked. As mentioned in section 2, analysing a superset of  the original
system can achieve verification, which is what “traditional” methods can not do.
8.1 Results
We have applied IVY Workbench to two subsystems of  the IAE’s TPGS. Two
different modelling strategies were used: building a “flat” model and building an
hierarchical model; although the first was discarded early on, due to verification
times. The language proved to be expressive enough to model the systems. Howev-
er in some cases, such as invariants, it can become very verbose as the model
grows and, with that, the model is difficult to maintain. The simulator that became
available during the research project proved to be quite useful, especially in the
initial phase of  modelling. It is easier to validate the initial design by experimenting
the model, rather than specifying CTL properties that return counterexamples that
show the paths intended to validate the model.
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In the verification of  models, we ended up discovering an error in the manual.
We were not expecting this kind of  results, nor was it one of  the objectives, but
ended up reinforcing the importance and usefulness of  such techniques. The
verification times recorded showed that, in terms of  verification, when the model
becomes more complex times become intolerable. The solution lies in trying to
verify small parts of  the system. Nevertheless, it should also be mentioned that,
since all variables have the same type of  behaviour, the inclusion of  more than
three variables in the model does not had much in terns of  verification.
Still regarding verification times, it was found that the NuSMV model checker
only use a core in the verification. Since the machines used for verification had
several cores, there is a lack of  use of  the existing computational power.
8.2 Future Work
Although the objectives have been met, the solutions are problems to be solved.
The language is already robust, however the suggestions made will make it even
more attractive and easier to use. Not being a laborious task, incorporating the
suggested “syntactic sugar” should be a priority.
A sensitive part is the verification, which in large models becomes very time
consuming and uses a lot of  resources (memory). In NuSMV it is possible to
rearrange the variables’ ordering in the BDD, and this has an impact on the perfor-
mance of  the model checker. It would be interesting to explore how the rearranging
on the variables affects the verification times.
NuSMV uses Minisat and ZChaff as SAT solvers. These SAT solvers do not
use the various cores available. There are parallel SAT solvers (e.g ManySAT1).
It is expectable that using a parallel SAT solver could considerably reduce the
verification time.
1http://www.cril.univ-artois.fr/jabbour/manysat.htm
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